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A commentary on
Commentary: Incubation and Intuition in Creative Problem Solving
by Yuan, Y., and Shen, W. (2016). Front. Psychol. 7:1807. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01807
Yuan and Shen (2016), in a commentary on Gilhooly’s (2016) explanation of incubation in terms of
Unconscious Work, suggested that a Dual Process account may be a useful alternative explanation.
Although Dual Process theories have been useful in studies of decision making (Greene, 2007) and
reasoning (Evans, 2008), I will argue that the usefulness of this approach to explaining incubation
is not clear.
Dual Process theories vary in their details (Smith and DeCoster, 2000; Evans, 2008; Stanovich,
2009) but arguably, there is a core “modal model” of Dual Process thinking, broadly as put forward
by Kahneman (2011), according to which System 1 processes are parallel, implicit, and unconscious,
and do not involve working memory or executive control and System 2 processes are sequential,
explicit, conscious, under executive control, and do load working memory.
In experimental studies, incubation periods, by definition, are periods in which a target task is to
be set aside and not consciously processed. During this period only unconscious processes (System
1) should be operative on the target task and it is hard to see, on the generally accepted definitions
of incubation and Dual Process Theory, how the System 2 component of Dual Process Theory
could be directly involved during the incubation period unless Intermittent (conscious) Work on
the target task is accepted as a possible explanation. On the basis of a number of studies looking at
this possibility, I feel we have been able to rule out the Intermittent (conscious) Work hypothesis
(Gilhooly et al., 2012, 2013).
The idea of Conscious Work and Unconscious Work occurring at different stages of creative
thinking, as classically proposed by Wallas (1926) and Poincare (1910), is consistent with a Dual
Process Theory, in that System 2 is evident in the initial conscious phase (Wallas’s Preparation
Stage) and the final Verification Stage, while System 1 is involved in the unconscious Incubation
stage. If this is what Yuan and Shen were proposing I would agree that there is a reasonablemapping
of the relatively new System 1 and 2 terminology onto the classical Stages terminology, and such
a mapping is of value in that it enables linkages to be made between creative problem solving and
other areas of thinking research, such as reasoning and decision making.
The nature and the duration of initial conscious (System 2) work in the Preparation stage have
been widely acknowledged to influence subsequent unconscious (System 1) processing during the
Incubation stage e.g., the classic analyses of Wallas and Poincare proposed that delayed Incubation
required extensive preliminary work to be effective. Similarly, the nature of the conscious work on
the interpolated task during the Incubation period is recognized to be a factor in determining the
effectiveness of unconscious work on the target task during the incubation period (Gilhooly et al.,
2013), in that both may be seen as competing for limited cognitive resources. So, in the standard
approach, System 2 processes can affect System 1 processes. In the other direction, System 1
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processes are important in determining how the target task
is initially represented and so influence subsequent System 2
processes.
However, Yuan and Shen seem to be proposing parallel System
1 and 2 processes, both bearing on the target task at the same
time (rather than System 2 dealing with an interpolated task
and System 1 dealing simultaneously with the target task during
the incubation period). They propose that with a very light
loading interpolated task e.g., rest, incubation becomes “...an
entirely conscious process.” This implies that the target task is
being processed consciously during such an incubation period,
which contradicts the definition of incubation as a period in
which the target task is not to be consciously addressed, and
seems to be re-stating the Intermittent Work hypothesis in
a more extreme form, as a Continuous Work Hypothesis, at
least for the case where no explicit interpolated task is given
during the incubation period. Indeed, they also state that “...the
conscious process underlying incubation is not intermittent
and always goes with unconscious processes during the whole
incubation period.” It is not clear if Yuan and Shen mean that
the continuous conscious processes are addressing the target
task or the interpolated task or both. If the conscious process
is only addressing the target task and is continuous, then there
is no incubation (and how could interpolated tasks be executed
without conscious attention?); if the conscious processes are
addressing solely the interpolated task (as instructed), then their
effects on the unconscious processes occurring at the same time
are incidental (as would be widely accepted). A third possibility
is of intermittent conscious work on the target task, which Yuan
and Shen seem to rule out (and is one which our data do not
support, Gilhooly et al., 2012, 2013).
We have not addressed the issue of incubation periods
with no specified interpolated tasks or with only very light
interpolated tasks in our experimental studies and it may
be that such conditions do promote mind wandering. Mind
wandering could lead to a return of the target task goal
to consciousness and some subsequent intermittent conscious
processing. However, Baird et al. (2012) reported that task
relevant thoughts during mind wandering in an incubation
period did not influence post incubation performance on Uses
tasks, but greater mind wandering was nevertheless beneficial.
Mind wandering could be viewed as an unconsciously driven
associative process (with conscious reportable outputs) which
re-distributes activation over elements in long term memory,
which in turn makes novel links more available when the
task is resumed after the incubation period. Mind wandering
thus could be seen as a type of System1 activity deliberately
engaged in during incubation periods with beneficial results. If
mind wandering is the kind of conscious process, that Yuan
and Shen are proposing, as always underlying incubation, I
can agree that this is a viable hypothesis. However, Yuan and
Shen do not explicitly mention mind wandering or similar
terms, such as daydreaming, so it is not clear whether my
interpretation of their outline model matches what the authors
intend.
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